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A Constructive Approach to Intensional Contexts 
-Remarks on the Metaphysics of Model Theory* 
Roland R. Hausser 
O. Introductory reDlarks 
The basic distinction between extensional and intensional contexts is one of different 
denotation conditions (truth conditions). 1 This difference in denotation conditions has been 
related to a fundamental question of semantic theory, namely; what do expressions of 
natural 'language denote? Most authors assume that in ex tensional contexts expressions 
denote 'real objects.' Since the rules of substitutivity of identicals and existential gener-
alization do not hold in intensional contexts (cf. section 1), they are thus forced to 
postulate that in intensional contexts expressions denote something else. Frege, for example, 
assumes a de notational ambiguity between 'Bedeutung' and 'Sinn', ~ussell between 'primary 
occurrences' and 'secondary occurrences', Quine between 'proper occurrences' and 'accidental 
occurrences', and Montague between 'extensions' and 'intensions .'2 
* This paper was written in the fall of 1979 during a stay as a vIsIting scholar at the 
Philosophy Department of Stanford University. I am grateful to Professor Moravscik and Professor 
Barwise for reading the manuscript. A 'number of very helpful comments by Professor Moravscik 
on the more philosophical issues addressed in the first part of the paper were faithfully incorporated 
into the text. The paper was originally written for a volume on in tensional contexts edited by 
Frank Heny, to whom I am indebted for a number of editorial improvements. His last minute 
request to strike the Donnellan passage (section 4) prevented the originally intended publication. 
The present text differs from the Stanford-manuscript in the addition of the concluding remarks 
of section 6 and the footnotes 5, 10, and 13. I would also like to thank Professor Kiyong Lee, 
Dr. Alice ter Meulen, Professor John Perry and Professor Theo Vennemann for helpful suggestions 
and encouragement. 
The content of this paper was presented at lectures at the Mathematics Department of 
Stanford University before a working group led by Professor Barwise on November 9, 1979, at 
Merton College of Oxford University on March 12, 1980, at the' 82 Workshop on Formal 
Grammar in Seoul, Korea, on January 6, 1982, and other places. I am grateful to Professor 
Chungmin Lee and other editors of Language Research for the publication of this paper. The research 
for this paper was supported by a research grant from the Deutsche Forschungs-gemeinschaft 
CDFG), Germany, which allowed me to stay a year at the Philosophy Department of the University 
of Pittsburgh and a second year at the Philosophy Department of Stanford University. The 
responsibility for all inadequacies and mistakes in this pape·r remains my own. 
1 I prefer the term "denotation conditions" over "truth conditions" because truth values are 
only one type of possible denotation. 




In this paper, I propose that expressions of natural language denote the same kind ' of 
'object' in extensional as well as in intensional contexts. This denotation is a certain kind 
of function (called 'intension' ) from an index to a formal extension. The difference 
between intensional and ex tensional contexts is thus not treated in terms of different 
kinds of denotations, but rather in terms of different denotation conditions. The formal 
treatment of this idea is formulated in terms of a 'strictly intensionalized' logic, i.e. a 
logic where the recursion of the syntactic and semantic rules is defined uniformly on the 
intensional level, and no intension operator "" is defined. This captures the intuition that 
there is 'no way back' from an extension to the respective intension. Extensions may be 
obtained in this logic over the extension operator 'v', which is still available. Such a 
system is formally much ' simpler than the in tensional logic defined in Montague (1974, 
chapter 8-henceforward PTQ) because the switching between the intensional and extensional 
level inherent in PTQ is avoided. In our system, an extensional predicate like find' and 
an intensional predicate like seek' are treated alike in that they are both analyzed as from 
in tensions to intensions . But their denotation conditions differ in that the extension of 
find' (x ) at an index depends solely on the extension of the argument x at that index, 
while the extension of seek' (x ) at an index will not depend solely on the extension of 
the argument x at that index. 
While the indicated treatment of in tensional versus extensional contexts in terms of 
uniform denotations but differentiated denotation conditions (defined in a strictly intension· 
alized system) is technically straightforward, it is ontologically objectionable insofar as the 
kind of denotation chosen, i.e. in tensions defined as functions from indices to extensions, 
depend on the concept of possible worlds, regarded by many as highly dubious. Thus, one 
might object to the indicated treatment in terms of a strictly intensionalized treatment be· 
cause it generalizes the problems formerly restricted to in tensional contexts to all kinds of 
expressions. Clearly, as long as the ontological problems associated with possible worlds 
are not resolved, extensions will be regarded as the primary kind of denotation and the 
extensional approach to meaning will appear on general grounds to be preferable as the 
conceptually simpler and ontologically more conservative analysis. For this reason a major 
portion of this paper will be devoted to the question of how to interpret model theoretic 
semantics in such a way that intensions rather than extensions become plausible as the 
primary kind of denotation . 
In standard model theory, the model structure is interpreted as a representation of 
reality and the denotation conditions as instructions to determine whether a sentence is true 
or false relative to the model structure and an index. Depending on how serious we take 
this identification of the model structure with reality, we have an intuitive problem with 
possible worlds. What does a possible world correspond to in reality? How could we go 
to one to check the truth value of sentence? How could we individuate possible individuals 
in possible worlds? These problems disappear, however, if we reinterpret the intuitive role 
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of the formal model structure. Alternatively to the standard approach let us View the 
model structure as a representation of the lexical intuition of a speaker/ hearer and the 
denotation conditions of a sentence as instructions to synthesize or construct a model (or 
set of models) relative to which the senterice would be true. Thus the purpose of inter-
preting an expression is not to determine its denotation relative to a model given in 
advance and regarded as a representation of reality, but rather to construct a denotation 
(or set of models) that would satisfy the expression and that it regarded as a formal 
representation of its literai meaning. We assume that tokens are synthesized in the ' lexical 
space' of a speaker, or rather an abstract speaker simulation device (SID). The lexical 
space is a partially defined model structure which specifies the denotation of all unanalyzed 
logical constants only insofar as to accommodate the presumed speaker's lexical intuition. 
While the switch from the "verifying mode" to the "synthesizing mode" in model 
theory resolves the intuitive problems with possible worlds, as I will argue in section 3, 
and thus obviates one of the objection to treating intensions as the primary kind of 
possible denotation, it raises the question: How do synthesized models relate to reality ? 
In order to relate the literal meaning of a token to reality, it is proposed in section 4 to 
complement the token models with a formal context which is defined as a model theoretic 
synthesis of what the speaker perceives and remembers at the moment of the token inter-
pretation. Reference (in ·contradistinction to denotation) is defined as the process of matching 
the token model with the context model. The pragmatic notion of reference provides, 
among other things, for a characterization of pragmatic truth of a token relative to a 
context. On the other hand , the semantic notion of denotation provides, among other 
things, for a characterization of semantic truth of a declarative sentence or formula relative 
to a (synthesized) model. 
That the traditional model theoretic approach may be too narrow to allow accommoda-
tion of such problems as context dependency, metaphor, and other natural language phenomena 
that go beyond a purely ex tensional approach to referential semantics has been acknowl-
edged in some of the recent literature. 3 So far, however, proposals to overcome the limits 
of the traditional approach have consisted in piecemeal additions which provide more or 
less ad hoc - and usually very abstract ~ solutions for specific problems, but do not question 
the fundamental setup. Examples are the so-called 'coordinates approach' (Montague, 1974; 
chapter 4 & Lewis, 1972), which · consists in adding new parameters to the point of 
reference in order to handle context dependency, and the proposal to use two-dimensional 
~ Bartsch (1979), for example, writes: "The question is how far one wants to go analyzing 
expressions in this manner, namely treating them as 'grammatical' or 'logical' formatives in the 
grammar of a language that is understo.od as a theory of truth for that language." In order to 
relativize semanics to speakers, Bartsch then introduces the concept of "semantical correctness", 
which is based on the notion "counting as evident or true for a population P with a language L", 
rather than on the notion "true in L" (relative to a model) . 
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possible world matrices to distinguish between the literal meaning of a token and its 
evaluation relative to an index (Stalnaker, 1978) . 
Partee (1978) has argued on the basis of problems arising with the treatment of 
propositional attitudes that "Montague's theory (and relevantly similar ones) cannot be 
the basis of a linguistic theory without some radical revisions in the foundations of 
semantics." The constructive approach tn model theory outlined in sections 3 & 4, it seems 
to me, represents such a radical . revision. What is essentially changed is our notion of 
assigning denotations to unanalyzed logical constants-a part of model theory that has been 
presumed without much question or interest. The formal side of logical semantics (i .e. the 
denotation conditions associated with logical operators) , however, is not affected by the 
switch from the "verifying mode" to the "synthesizing mode." 
As far as the analysis of intensional versus extensional contexts in the present paper 
IS concerned, the constructive approach to model theory is motivated because: 
a) It allows a natural denotation conditional treatment of propositional attitudes, 
due to the relativization of the lexical model structure to a speaker (cf. sections 
6 & 7) . 
b) It avoids the standard ontological objections against the use of possible worlds, 
since models are treated as constructed representations of literal meaning, rather 
than representations of reality given in advance (cL section 3) . 
c) It allows treating intensions rather than extensions as the primary kind of 
denotation of the logic. Thus sentences are defined to denote propositions rather 
than truth values and predicates are defined to denote properties rather than 
sets. In this way the counterintuitive consequence that all true sentences denote 
the same entity is avoided.4 
In more general terms, the constructive approach is preferable because the separation of 
denotation and reference allows a surface compositional treatment of literal meaning and 
gives a precise definition of pragmatics. The use of an expression relative to a context is 
analyzed in terms of matching two model theoretic structures (i.e. the token-model and 
the context-model) . As far as the definition of pragmatics and the role of context is 
concerned, the alternative approach to model theoretic presented in this paper constitutes 
the semantico-pragmatic basis for my treatment of non-declarative sentence moods (interro-
gatives, imperatives) in terms of characteristic types of possible denotation (Hausser, 1976b 
• It was Frege (1892) , who proposed tha t declara tives denote t ruth values (functions f rom 
possible worlds into extensions had not been proposed a t the time) . On the one hand, Frege' s idea 
was a grea t achievement because it completed the assignment of precise possible denotations to the 
major parts of speech: proper names were thought to denote individuals, predicates sets of indivi-
duals, and sentences truth values. On the other hand" it had the indica ted counter intuitive conse-
quence that all true sentences denote the same object. Frege was aware of this problem. For a 
discussion see R.S. Wells (1951). 
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& 1978a) and my treatment" of pronouns in terms of context variables (Hausser; 1979a 
& b) . 
1. What is the problem posed by intensional contexts? 
In logic, ex tensional contexts are characterized by two rules, namely (i) substitutivity 
of identicals and (ii) existential generalization. Substitutivity of identicals is illustrated as 
follows: 
Cl) John finds the morning star. 
Since the morning star happens to be the evening star and (1) happens to be an extensional 
context, we may replace 'the mornin~ star' by 'the evening star' salva veritate. That is, 
the substitution in (2) 
(2) John finds the evening star. 
does not result in a change in truth value. 
Existential generalization is illustrated as follows: 
(3) John finds a unicorn. 
(3) entails (4) . 
(4) There is at least one Unlcorn. 
That is, whenever (3) is true, (4) is true. 
The rules of substitutivity of identicals (SI) and existential generalization (EG) are 
important to the extensional approach to logical semantics, which characterizes meaning 
as a direct relation between expressions and referents, without the intermediate stage of 
a concept. It has long been noted, however, that in natural language there are systematic 
exceptions to the rules of SI and EG. Those syntactic environments in which SI and EG 
fail are called opaque context (Quine, 1960) or intensional contexts (Montague, "1974). 
Consider for example (5) and (6): 
(5) Necessarily, the morning star is the morning star. 
(6) Necessarily, the morning star is the evening star. 
While (5) is intuitively true, (6) is not, even though (7) 
(7) The morning star is the evening· star. 
happens to be true. Thus the modal operator necessarily creates an intensional " context 
which causes substitutivity of identicals to fail. 
Turning to EG, consider (8). 
(8) John seeks a unicorn. 
While (3) entails (4), (8) does not entail (4). 
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(3) John finds a unicorn. 
(4) There is at least one unicorn. 
Thus, seek in contrast to find creates an intensional context, causing existential generali-
zation with respect to the object term to fail. 
As long as expressions like the morning star or a unicorn are regarded as denoting 
their extensional referents, SI and EG clearly must hold. In intensional contexts, however, 
where SI and EG do not hold, "the expressions in question cannot denote their 'natural' 
ex tensional referents. After all, (8) can be true whether or not any unicorns exist. 
Intensional contexts raise a serious problem for the extensional approach to meaning insofar 
as they represent a systematic exception to the extensionalist doctrine stated below: 
(9) extensionalist doctrine 
Meaning is a direct relation between expressions and their 'real' referents . 
For the extensional approach, the problem with intensional contexts may be summarized 
in the following question: what is the denotation of expressions in intensional contexts? 
Any solution to this problem must accommodate the following intuitive facts observable in 
connection with intensional contexts: 
i) . An expression like a unicorn IS as meaningful in an intensional context as III an 
extensional context. 
ii) An expression like a unicorn does not denote its ' natural', extensional referent 
in intensional contexts (as witnessed by the failure of SI and EG). 
However, no matter how the question of denotation in intensional contexts is resolved , the 
basic distinction between intensional and extensional contexts is one of different denotation 
conditions. The essential objective of a semantic analysis of intensional and ex tensional 
contexts is to account for the respective failure versus validity of SI and EG. Note that 
to define different denotation conditions does by no means require the use of different kinds 
of denotations. 
2. Extensional versus intensional approaches to meaning 
Besides the extensional notion of meaning summarized in (9) , which Frege (1892) 
called "Bedeutung", there has traditionally been another notion according to which the 
meaning of an expression is a concept rather than an object. This conceptual notion of 
meaning, called "Sinn" by Frege (op. cit), may be traced back to Plato. The work in 
model theoretic semantics, as developed by Carnap (1947), Church (1951), Kripke (1963) , 
Montague (1974) , and others, provides a formalization of the conceptual notion of meaning 
in terms of so-called intensions. According to this approach, aB. intension is defined as a 
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function from indices (world/ time pairs) to extensions. 5 This formalization captures the 
intuition that to know the meaning of an expression A is to know the extensiOIl of A in 
any given situation.6 
Let us call an approach to meaning intensional if the relation between an expression 
and its referent is mediated via the concept associated with the expression. An in tensional 
approach to meaning may be schematically characterized as in OOa): 
CID) a. expression 
I 
concept (intension, "Sinn") 
I 
referent (extension, "Bedeutung" ) 
The definition of conceptual meaning In terms of certain functions (intensions) provides a 
denotation for expressions in intensional contexts which has the desired characteristics 
regarding SI and EG. 
Regarding SI (substitutivity of identicals) , consider for instance the Fregean examples 
given above: 
(5) Necessarily, the morning star IS the morning star. 
(6) Necessarily, the morning star IS the evening star. 
That substitution of the efJening star for the morning star in (6) does not preserve truth 
values follows from the assumption that the underlined terms in (5) and (6) denote their 
5 Putnam (1975, chapter 12) points out that the notion of an intension as a concept, on the 
one hand, and the notion of an intension as an extension-determining function, on the other. are 
two different notions which are moreover incompatible. The reason according 'to Putnam is that 
concepts are something mental and thus in the head of the speaker/hearer, whereas extensions are 
treated as the objects of the ,external world. Since Putnam chooses to define meaning as an 
extension-determining function (cf. Putnam, 1975: 270), he is led to the counterintuitive conclusion 
tha t "meanings just ain't in the head" (Putnam, 1975: 227). 
However, if we interpret the notion 'extension' as a conceptual extension, then an intension 
may be regarded as a concept which is defined as a function from conceptual (i_e. speaker-
subjective) world / time pairs to conceptual extensions. The purpose of a thus interpreted intension 
continues to be the formal treatment of modal operators, tense operators, and the distinction 
between intensional and extensional predicates. 
When we talk in the following about intensions as functions from indices to "formal extensiqns" 
we mean conceptual extensions. Reference to objects of the real world (i.e. Putnarn's extensions) 
is treated in our theory in terms of matching a speaker internal meaning-concept of a token with 
a speaker internal context, whereby the context reflects the external reality on the b¥sis of the 
speakers perception. , 
6 Let us keep in mind, however, that the notions "concept" and "intension" are not equivalent. 
For example, while the formal in tensions of '2+2' and '4' are identical in the sense that they 
always have the same extension, '2+2' and '4' intuitivdy express different concepts. We may 
provide a more appropriate formalization of the notion "concept" on the basis of so-called intensional 
isomorphisms (Carnap, 1947) . That is, two expressions express the same concept if and only if 
they have the same syntactic structure and' all their- respective constituents have the same 
in tensions. 
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respective intensions, rather their extensions. Though these intensions take the same 
extension in our world , namely the planet Venus, the morning star and the evening star 
could have had different extensions, and thus must have different intensions. 
Whiie intertsions provide the formal basis for a systematic model theoretic analysis 
of many traditional puzzles of natural language (as illustrated in Montague's PTQ) , the 
use of intensions is not generally accepted. The main reason seems to be an ontological 
one: most philosophers of language prefer to let language expressions denote 'real' objects 
rather than abstract concepts. 7 Even though intensional logic has provided a formal 
definition of concepts in terms of certain functions, these functions are defined by means 
of the notion of 'possible worlds' - which cannot be real. We call an approach to meaning 
extensional if it avoids the postulation of an intermediate level of concepts or intensions, 
anti defines meaning as a direct relation between expressions and referents Cc.L (9)) . An 
extensional approach to meaning may be schematically characterized as in (l Ob) -in 
contrast to (lOa) : 
(l 0) b. expression 
I 
referent (extension, "Bedeutung" ) 
The extensional approach claims to represent a more realistic attitude towards the entities 
admitted as referents of expressions. In this sense it seems to suit better the philosophical 
quest for 'real' truth. After all, how can we arrive at reliable resu lts with our logic if 
the objects referred to are not real? 
The question of what is real, though, is notoriously controversial. One tradition is 
that of nominalism, which takes a 'real' thing to mean a spatio·temporal thing . That is, 
a thing we can potentially touch. As a consequence of this view, many noun and verb 
phrases of natural language (e.g . hope, desire, pain, etc .) do not have a denotation and 
thus cannot be assigned a meaning. In another tradition, that of realism, mathematical 
entities like numbers are also admitted to be real. The realists thus admit at least 
mathematical truth into their ontology, but the problem still remains that there are no 
suitable objects to serve as referents for many expressions of natural language. 
It is a consequence of the extensionalist definition of meaning that only those 
expressions have a meaning for which there exists a referent. Since the referents are 
furthermore required to be 'real' in some intuitive sense, the question of which expressions 
are regarded to have meaning depends on what is considered to be real (or existent). 
Furthermore, only expressions of the main linguistic categories (i.e. noun phrase, verb, 
and sentence) are assumed to have meaning, since there are no 'objects' to which prepo-
sitions, conjunctions, or articles could refer to. 
Since for most expressions of natural language there are no intuitively plausible 
7 For a discussion see Carnap (1950). 
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objects or sets of objects available, proponents of the extensional approach are faced with 
a choice between the following two positions : 
a) In order to assign meaning to expressions where no natural referents are available, 
the range of referents is expanded by adopting an extremely wide notion of 
what is considered to be real. 
b) In order to maintain a strict notion of what is considered real, most expressions 
of natural language are simply assumed to have no meaning by themselves. 
The first position was advocated by Meinong (1904) , who took the Vlew that every 
grammatically well formed expression of natural language has a meaning. Note that 
Meinong's approach is extensional insofar as it does not assume an intermediate level of 
conceptual meaning.s The second position was defended by Russell (1905) , in direct 
opposition to Meinong. According to Russell, "denoting expressions never have any 
meaning in themselves, but . .. every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has 
a meaning." 
While Meinong's assumption of non-existent real objects leads to contradictions, 
Russell's postulate that only complete declarative sentences have a' meaning violates a very 
basic linguistic intuition. An approach using intensions, on the other hand, is not subject 
to these objections. Frege, for example, avoids breach of the law of contradiction by 
distinguishing "in a denoting phrase two elements, which we may call the meaning and 
the denotation" (Russell, 1905: 45) or Sinn and Bedeutung. According to Frege, expressions 
like the present King of France, Pegasus, or the square circle are meaningful in that they 
denote certain concepts, but lack a natural referent and are ' therefore assigned the null 
class as referent. Russell's only objection to Frege' s theory is that Russell regards the 
null-class as an "artificial" referent. 
Concluding this section on what we called extensional versus intensional approaches 
to meaning, let us summarize the possible answers to the question "What should natural 
language expressions be defined to denote? ". 
(12) a. We may strictly maintain the extensionalist doctrine (9) , according to 
which expressions denote their real life referents directly and either 
(i) pay the price as far as the description of natural language is concerned 
by not assigning any meaning to most expressions (this approach is 
exemplified by RusseH (1905), or 
(ii) pay the price as far as ontology is concerned by postulating "virtual" 
objects in order to provide referents for all grammatically well-formed 
B At first sight, and without a precise definition of what an extensional vs. intensional approach 
to meaning is, one would perhaps be inclined to classify Meinong as an intensionalist rather that 
an extensionalist. The obiections to weaknesses in Meinong's theory, however, do not carry over 
to intensional systems, since Meinong's system is in fact a purely extensional one. 
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expressions (this approach is exemplified by Meinong (1904) ). 
(12) b. We may adopt a weakened version of the extensionalist doctrine according 
to which expressions denote their real life referents whenever possible (i.e. 
in extensional contexts) and denote concepts or intensions otherwise. This 
approach is exemplified by Frege (1892), who assumes that expressions 
are systematically ambiguous between a referential meaning ("Bedeutung") 
and a conceptual 'meaning ( "Sinn") . 
(12) c. We may abandon the extensionalist doctrine completely by letting expressions 
always denote intensions, defined as functions from indices to formal 
extensions. 
As indicated already we will adopt the approach (12c) . In order to justify this choice, 
let us turn now to some of the basic ontological questions raised by the in tensional 
approach to meaning. 
3. Reinterpreting the intuitive role of the formal model 
When we evaluate a model theoretic treatment of meaning In natural language, we 
must distinguish between two different questions. First, there is the formal question of 
defining a system which assigns the right entailments and general meaning structures to 
expressions. Then there is also the ontological question of what intuitive role the model 
is assumed to play. In the case of intensional logic, there is a troublesome dichotomy 
between a very successful treatment of denotation conditions (and associated paradoxes) , 
on the one hand, and a continuing difficulty with old, fundamental and well-rehearsed 
ontological issues, on the other. Since the source of the specific success as well as the 
problems may be located in the use of possible worlds, let us discuss the formal role of 
possible worlds and then turn to the question of which ontological interpretations one 
might attach to them. 
Formally, model theoretic denotations are built up from the basic sets of the model 
structure (A, I, J, .,;;;, F ). The non-empty sets A, I , and J are regarded as sets of individuals, 
possible worlds, and moments of -time, respectively , .,;;; is a linear ordering on J, and F is 
a denotation which assigns logical constants their model-theoretic denotation in accordance 
with their semantic type. The domain of intensions is defined as the set of ordred pairs 
(i, j) , i E I, j E J, in the Cartesian product I X J. The three basic sets A, I and J function 
alike in that they (i) provide the building blocks for the denotations of logical constants 
(i.e. they provide the domain and range of the functions denoted) and (ii) they serve in 
the definitions of the logical operators. Thus, just as individuals serve in the definition of 
quantifiers like Yx (ifJ) or Ax(ifJ) , and moments function in the definition of tense 
operators like W (ifJ) or H (ifJ), possible worlds function in the definition of modal operators 
like 0 CifJ) or 0 (ifJ). Formally speaking, possihle worlds are no different from individuals or 
moments of time, i.e. they are elements of one of the basic sets which serve as the 'domain 
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and range of the denotation functions and which are referred to in the denotation conditions 
of the logic. 
While the model structure is formally a set· or function-theoretic construction which 
assigns values (denotations) to the logical constants relative to indices, this same model 
structure is intuitively usually interpreted as a representation of reality . This conceptuali-
zation of the formal model structure (or interpretation) is in some respects a convenient 
abstraction which seems to allow reasoning about real things without adressing the q~estion 
of how reference is actually established by the speaker/ hearer . Yet, as long as the model 
structure is treated as a substitute for reality relative to which truth or falsity of formulas 
is determined , possible worlds constitute an enigma: what does a possible world correspond 
to in reality? How could we individuate possible individuals in possible worlds ? We cannot 
go to a possible world to check the denotation of expressions because there is only one 
world, namely our present day real world . This intuitive problem with possible worlds, 
which depends on how serious we take the identification of the model structure with 
'reality', constitutes the basis for the standard ontological objection against intensional 
logic, namely that possible worlds cannot be real. 
The basis for this objection is removed, however, if we reinterpret the intuitive role 
of the formal model structure. Rather than treating the model structure as a representation 
of reality and the denotation conditions as instructions to determine the truth value of 
formulas relative to an index, let us view the model structurure as a representation of the 
lexical intuition of the speaker/hearer and the denotation conditions of a sentence token 
as instructions to synthesize or construct a model (or set of models) relative to which the 
sentence would be true. Thus the purpose of semantically interpreting an expression is 
not to determine its denotation relative to a model (in a model structure at an index) 
given in advance and regarded as a representation of reality (at that index), but rather 
to construct a denotation (or model) that would satisfy the expression and that is regarded 
as a formal representation of its literal meaning. 
We assume that the synthesis of a token meaning is executed m a partially defined 
model structure, called lexical space, which is assumed to be part of a speaker simulation 
device (SID). What is required for the synthesis of a token meaning? While the logical 
operators like -, " , J., etc. in the translation of a token receive their meaning in terms of 
the denotation conditions associated with these operators (where the denotation conditions 
are specified in a metalanguage or in terms of certain operations), unanalyzed logical 
constants like man' or walk' are assigned their denotation by the model structure. The 
structuring principles of the lexical space are: 
i) the category/type/ denotation correspondence inherent in Montague Grammar, and 
ii) the speaker' s intuition concerning the semantic interrelations between constants 
of equal type such as inclpsion, overlap, etc. 
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Take for example the expressions cat, dog, and mammal, which are of categegory tile. 
They translate into the unanalyzed constants cat', dog', and mammal', which are of type 
<s, « s,e), t». This type uniquely determines · the denotation of these expressions as 
functions with the following domain range structure: 9 
ClxJ->CClxJ->A) -> {O, ll )) 
In order to implement the lexical intuition of an English speaker we define the denotation 
of cat' and dog' in the lexical model as disjunct sets (extensionally speaking). Furthermore, 
we define the denotation of cat' and dog' as subsets of the denotation of mammal'. In this 
way, we arrive at a definition of lexical meaning which avoids the use of paraphrase (which 
would be circular) and which employs the model theoretic technique without identifying 
the model structure with reality. 
To synthesize a token in the lexical space of an SID means to set the denotations 
of the constants in the translation formula into certain interrelationships specified by the 
logical operators in the formula. For example, to synthesize the meaning of John walks 
we have to set the denotation of j as an element of the denotation of walk'.lo Note that 
the partially defined model structure of our lexjcal space differs form the partial models 
proposed in Friedman et al. (1978) . In Friedman et al. the model is conceived as a partial-
ly defined substitute for reality, which means that as new expressions come up in a 
text, new denotations are defined in the model. Thus, in order to interpret John walks 
at an index a denotation is· assigned to, e.g. walk', if it has not been specified already. 
The evaluation of expressions relative to indices in the Friedman model structure is still 
intended to determine truth values. Our lexical space, on the other hand, is a partially 
defined model structure not because certain aspects of reality have not been filled in yet, 
but because the model structure specifies only the semantic interrelation of constants 
according to the speakers intuition. A completely specified model Cor denotation) comes 
about only once the synthesis instructions associated with the logical operators present in 
the translation of a token have been executed. 
The synthesizing approach, it seems to me, effectively removes the standard 
o We anticipate here the strictly in tensional category/ type correspondence outlined in section 
3, a·ccordirig to which a surface expression of category a translates into an expession of type ( s, 
f(a ) rather than of type ( f (a) as in PTQ. 
10 This description of the partial model-structure underlying our synthesis approach is still 
preliminary. For a more detailed discussion see Hausser (1981) , where it is pointed out that a 
characterization of, e.g. RED and BLUE as denoting distinct sets in the partial model structure 
which are both sub-sets of CaLOR does not suilice for a complete analysis of these elementary 
meanings_ What is needed is a characterization of the specific difference between, e.g. RED and 
BLUE. It is proposed to specify this difference by means of concepts which are defined in terms 
of matching different kinds of elementary sense data. Thus the difference between, e.g. RED and 
BLUE would ultimately be explained in terms of the SID's perception (e.g. of light of different 
wave length). Another important notion used in the paper mentioned is that of an 'operationalized 
meta ·language definition ' . 
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ontological objections to the use of possible worlds and intensions.ll Since we do not 
treat the model structure as a representation of reality, we are not faced with intuitive 
problem of what would correspond in reality to going to a possible world and checking a 
truth value there. Questions of transworld identity are likewise unproblematic. Since we 
interpret possible worlds merely as indices of alternative states which are constructed, 
identity is simply asserted rather than verified. 
4. Denotational semantics versus referential pragmatics 
While the switch from the "verifying mode" to the "synthesizing mode" . in model 
theory resolves the intuitive problems with possible worlds, and thus obviates one of the 
main objections against treating intensiolls as the primary kind of possible denotation, it 
also creates new problem. The question is : how do synthesized models relate to reality? 
In order to relate the literal meaning of a token to reality, let us complement the 
synthesized token meaning with a formal context which is defined as the model theoretic 
synthesis of what the speaker (SID) perceives and remembers at the moment of the token 
interpretation. Reference (in contradistinction to denotation) is treated as the process of 
matching the synthesized token with the synthesized context. We may schematically 
indicate the difference between the traditional model theoretic approach and the constructive 
approah advocated here as follows: 




model, serving . 
as representation 
of reality articulation/ perception 
reality ( real token) 
( real SID-environment) 
ii) constructive approach: 
r- - - - -, SID 
I ~ 









boo o 0 model, serving as abstract 
I 
I L _ __ .. 
represeritation of 
speaker context 
11 V.d. Emde Boas and Janssen (1978) propose to treat possible worlds as computer states and 
poin t out "Since these states can actually be constructed no ontological problems arise." They do 
not adress the question, however, of how these states may be related to reality, a question we 
have treated in terms of matching the synthesized token-meaning with the synthesized cont~xt. 
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The SID functions as a speaker if the direction of the indicated mapping is from reference 
over the token model and token expression to articulation. If the direction is from perception 
over the token expression and the token model to refernce, on the other hand, the SID 
functions as a hearer. 
While our synthetic approach to literal meaning remains formally completely 
within the standard model·theoretic approach in that nothing in the denotation conditions 
has to be changed, it differs ontO-logically from various formulations of the traditional 
logical view in that the basic sets A, I, J (regarded as sets of individuals, sets of possible 
worlds, and sets of moments of time, respectively) in our formal model @ = (A, I, J, < ,F) 
cannot be assumed to contain any real objects . Instead, in line with our synthetic approach, 
we assume that our model operates exclusively with abstract entities Ce.g. memory cells in 
the SID). By dealing only with abstract denotations we arrive at the most uniform and 
parsimonious ontology for model theoretic semantics possible. Physical existence is simply 
treated as another property which may be asserted. 
The legitimate questions of ontology reappear, however, in the separate construction 
of the context. Regarding the model· theoretic construction of what the speaker or the SID 
perceives optically, acoustically, touch-wise, smell-wise, and taste-wise we must indeed 
consider the question what is real, what the categories of things are, etc. By having two 
model theoretic structures between which the pragmatic process of reference is sandwiched, 
we separate the linguistic categories (determined on the basis of the combinatorial and 
denotational properties of surface expressions) from ontological categories. 
The indicated reinterpretation of model theoretic semantics and the associated formal 
treatment of context permits a strict distincation between the literal meaning of an 
expression (meaning!) and the speaker meaning (meaning2), i.e . the meaning intended by 
the speaker or arrived at by the hearer. The literal meaning of an expression (meaning!) 
is analysed semantically in terms of the denotation , i.e. the synthesized model which 
satisfies the literal meaning of the expression. The speaker meaning (meaning2) is analysed 
pragmatically in terms of reference, i.e. the use of the literal meaning relative to a 
context:!2 
use of meaning!= meaning2 
The use of meaning! relative to a context is treated in our system in terms of interpreting 
the matching relation between the two model structures. Since we assume that both 
model-structures (representing (a) the token and Cb) the context) are synthesized in the 
same lexical space, we have two distinct patterns in one medium such that the two can 
12 Our notion of literal meaning is more restricted that that of Wunderlich (1976), who defines 
the literal meaning of a sentence as a speech act concept which determines the result of using the 
sentence relative to a neutral context. For us, literal meaning is defined completely within the 
domain of syntax and semantics. Closest to Wunderlich's notion is our concept of literal reference 
discussed below. 
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be directly compared or matched. 
While the semantic analysis of literal meaning (denotation) is strictly compositional, 
the pragmatic analysis of use (reference) is flexible in the sense that we may distinguish 
between different types of matching a synthesized token with a synthesized context. One 
type of reference is literal reference, which we analyse as the case where the model 
structure representing the token meaning matches the context completely. Let us consider 
an example ,ot literal reference where a speaker and a hearer see a red car and the 
speaker says "This car is red" . 
i SID- l I 
~" I , d 
1 fllS car IS re 
i 
V x(c.u(x)Ared(x) ) 
® ~/ I , I l 
~) .. , , , 
speaker 
,( Articulation) " , 
" I'll /$ car i $ reel" 










SID- l represents an SID m a 'speaker-state' . We assume that the SID perceives a certain 
pattern which relates to the constant 'car' in its lexical space. SID- l also perceives a 
certain color (wave-length in the electromagnetic spectrum) which relates to the constant 
'red' in its lexical space. Based on these perceptions, the context model is built up . 
Assuming SID- l has an impulse to report its perception, the context model structure (or 
relevant parts of it) are mapped into a token surface representation and articulated. SID-2 
represents an SID in a 'hearer· state' . Like SID-l, SID-2 perceives the red car, and 
assuming SID-2 has the same perception' as SID- i , SID-2 will construct the same context 
model as SID- l. Furthermore, SID-2 perceives the token uttered by SID-l. Assuming 
t hat SID-2 speaks the same language as SID-l , this token will be represented in the 
lexical space of SID- 2 in the same 'way as in the lexical space of SID- l, and SID-2 will 
judge SID-l' s utterance as true because the statment agrees with its ob~ervation. 
While the analysis of this example is still somewhat crude , it suffices to demonstrate 
that the classical view of truth as correspondence between what is said and what is 
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(Aristotle, Metaphysics) reappears in our system as a special case, namely the case of 
literal reference in which the sensory input is faithful to reality. As an example where 
perception is mistaken on part of the speaker consider Donnellan' s case (Donnellan, 
1966) , in which someone refers to a man with a glass of ginger ale as <the man with 
the champagne in his glass' , asserting of him correctly that he is happy. On the 
extensional approach (according to which meaning is defined as a direct relation between 
expressions and real situations or objects), the following problem arises: ho.w can we 
say something true of an intended referent if the description used is incorrect-i.e. if no 
reference should have been possible in the first place? On our alternative approach, the 
problem disappears. We analyse the speaker as follows: the context-representation 
disagrees with reality, but the token-representation (complete with champagne) agrees 
with the context-representation. The hearer, on the other hand , is analyzed such that 
the context-representation agrees with reality (complete with ginger ale) , while the 
token-representation disagrees with the context-representation. Donnellan's . example 
describes an instance of 'charitable' reference on part of the hearer in the sense that 
there is a partial matching between the token meaning (model representing a man with 
champagne) and the context model (representing a man with ginger ale) . 
Another type of charitable reference is vague reference. While in Donnellan's case 
charitable reference on part of the hearer is due to an incorrect perception on part of the 
speaker, vague reference may come about simply by failure to find the 'right words.' 
Charitable reference must be distinguished from metaphoric reference. In the case of 
charitable reference, the discrepancy between the token model and the context model is 
<repaired' to a state of literal reference. In the case of metaphoric reference , however, 
the discrepancy is associated with a 'higher meaning'. Consider for example the token 
'The old fox quietly left the room' interpreted relative to a context in which our 
favorite detective is seen in action. Again, we systematically synthesize the literal 
meaning (complete with fox) and base the pragmatic interpretation (what amounts to the 
sp~aker meaning) in part on a matching of higher order properties (in our case cunningness). 
This approach to metaphor is in concord with the scholastic analysis, which held that each 
thing meant (denoted) by a word has itself a set of meanings, consisting of the properties 
of a denotation of an expression determines the potential for its metaphoric use. 
On the standard approach, where denotation and reference are not distinguished, 
the indicated differences between literal, charitable, and metaphoric reference cannot be 
handled without ad hoc changes in the formal semantics, usually formulated in terms of 
so-called 'ambiguities ' . These ambiguities, however, have no structural basis, they are 
ambiguities of use rather than genuine syntactico-semantic ambiguities. On our constructive 
approach, on the other hand, no ambiguities need to be postulated for the cases in question. 
Rather, the literal meaning is treated strictly compositionally as a function of the meaning 
of the basic constituents and their mode of composition (Frege's principle) , while different 
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speaker meanings are treated in terms of different types of reference (i.e. different 
interpretations of the matching relation between the synthesized token and the synthesized 
context) . In that our approach allows to restrict the syntactico-semantic analysis to the 
most literal meaning, it provides the semantico-pragmatic basis for maintaining the principle 
of surface compositionality (Hausser , 1978a & b). 
While the reinterpretation of model theoretic semantics in terms of synthesis does 
not affect the formal side of meaning analysis (as formulated terms of denotation 
conditions) , it represents a rather radical departure from the tradit.ional view of semantics. 
Semantics is usually said to investigate the relation between expressions and the 'world' . 
This characterization, however, no longer holds in the constructive approach to model 
theory outlined above. Instead semantics is limited to a model-theoretic characterization 
of the li tera l meaning of language expressions, while the relation between expressions 
and the world is treated in terms of pragmatics and perception. The central notion of 
truth in a model is common to both the traditional approach and the constructive 
approach, but this notion has quite a different flavor depending on whether the model is 
treated as a substitute for reali ty or as an abstract entity synthesized in such a way that 
it would make the sentence under interpretation true. 
Let us ret race the line of our argument so far. In order to treat intensions as primary 
denotations, we wanted to eliminate the ontological objections to possible worlds. We did 
that by reinterpreting the model structure from a representation of reality to a represen-
tat ion of lexical intuition . This raised the questi·on of how synthesized token models relate 
to reality. Our answer was to define context as a model theoretic representation of what 
the speaker/ hearer perceives and remembers, and reference as the matching of the two 
model structures. By far the best developed part of the described theory is the compositional 
(in contrast to lexical) aspect of the mapping from surface expressions of natural language 
to model-theoretic denotations (our synthesized token models)-known as Montague Grammar. 
Note, however, that as far as the intuitive interpretation of the formal model is concerned, 
Montague remained firmly within the traditional approach. The re-analysis of intensional 
contexts in a PTQ-type system developed in the following two sections will show in what 
way our reinterpretation of model theory leads to an overall simplification of Montague' s 
syntactico-semantic system. 
5. The role of meaning postulates in Montague's analysis 
As long as the model is viewed as a substitute for reality and no distinction is 
made between denotation and reference, extensions may be plausibly viewed as the primary 
kind of possible denotation. On the synthesis approach, however, extensions are merely 
certain values in an abstract lexical space. Thus we may view intensions, i.e. the functions 
which take formal extensions as their values , as the primary kind of possible denotation-
especially since 
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a ) the intuitive problems with possible worlds do not arise on the synthesis approach, 
and 
b) it allows definition of expressions in intensional contexts to denote the same 
'things' (functions) as in extensional contexts. 
Let us call a grammatical' system in which expressions are uniformly represented by 
in tensional types a strictly intensionalized system. 
Due to the general acceptance of extensions as primary denotations, strictly inten-
sional systems have not yet been widely explored. The first formal grammar of English 
where surface expressions translate uniformly into intensions (such that sentences denote 
prc?positions, predicates denote properties, etc. ) was defined in Hausser (1978b). In this 
strictly intensionalized system, called ILl-El' which generates basically the same fragment 
as PTQ, the logi~al rules are defined in such a way that the recursion operates uniformly 
on the intensional level. l3 
As an illustration of the difference between the PTQ and the ILl logic consider the 
respective rules for ',,' (i. e. ' the connective "and"): 
13 An earlier attempt to de,fine such a logic is Lewis 0972, 1974) . But Lewis did not succeed 
since he defined functions from in tensions to in tensions which are themselves extensions: 
extension 
I 
«s,a), <s, b» 
in tensions 
Therefore, the recursion does not work in Lewis system In those cases where a functor (e.g, verb 
walks) serves as the argument of a higher functor (e. g. the adverb slowly). Let us consider the 
type structure of these two words. Walks takes the intension of a term (type (s,T») as argument 
and renders the intension of a sentence as value(type (s,t»). Thus, walks is of type « s,T), ( s,t» . 
Slowly, on the other hand, takes the intension of intransitive verb like walk as argument and 
renders the intension of an intransitive verb as value. Thus, slowly is of type «s,«s,T) , ( s, t»), 
( s, « s,T) , ( s,t»). Since slowly takes in tensions as arguments while walk is an extension, slowly 
cannot be applied to walk in Lewis system. 
Lewis may, of course, raise the type of, e.g. walk syntactically to an intension when it is used 
as an argument. But such a grammar w'ould be even more complicated than Montague' s PTQ. In 
PTQ, arguments of functional application are always extensions which are syntactically raised to 
intensions, whereas Lewis would have to distinguish between ex tensional and in tensional arguments. 
Our sys tem, on the other hand, is a strictly intensional system in that the recursion operates 
uniformly on the intensional level without any special syntactic remedies such as syncategorematic 
operations in the process of the translation from categorially analyzed English to intensionallogic. 
Instead we define functors of intensional logic as ' intensions which take functions from intentions 
to extensions ,as their value. Thus, e.g. walk is of type (s,« s,T), t» in our system. Functional 
application, furthermore, is defined as follows: 
functor 
a ( 5, «s,a >,b » 
argument 
fJ (s ,a ) 
result 
a ({3) <s, b > 
Our system is strictly in tensional in that the functor, the argument, and the result of functional 
application of the functor to the argument are all of intensional types. Slowly is in our system of 
type ( s, « s, « s, T ) , t» , «s, T ), t»). Functional application to walk renders slowly (walk) , which is 
of type (s, « s, T ) , t» , as desired. 
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PTQ: 
(13) a. If t/>,1'EME" then [t/>"1']EME,. 
b. If t/>,1'EME" then [t/>"t/>] @,;,i,g is 1 if and only if t/>@,;,i,g is 1 and 1'@,;, i,g lS 1. 
ILl: 
(14) a. If t/>,1'EME <s,,) , then [t/>"1']EME<s,,). 
b. If t/>,rjlE ME<s,,), then [t/>"1']@,g is a function from IxJ to D"A,I,J such that 
[Vet/> " 1')]@,;,i,g is 1 iff [vt/>] @,;,i,g is 1 and [v1']@,;,i,~ is 1. 
The 'intensionalization' of ' ,, ' from a sentential to a propositional operator indicated above 
applies mutatis mutandis to all logical operators of ILl (cL appendix, section 4) . . 
The crucial difference between (13) and (14) resides in the semantic types. In (13) , 
the input expressions t/> and l' as well as the output expression 't/> " 1" are of type t, which 
means that these expressions denote truth values. In (14), on the other hand, the input 
and output expressions are of type (s, t), which means that these expressions denote 
functions from I X J to truth values (propositions) . In this sense, ,,, ' is defined as a 
sentential operator in (13) but as a propositional operator in (14). As far as the actual 
assignment of truth values is concerned, however, (13) and (14). render precisely the same 
results. 
The commonly known 'in tensional logics' are so-called because of the presence of 
an intensional operator, and the concomitant presence of some intensional denotations (in 
addition to the 'normal' extensions). But PTQ, for example, like all these 'intensional' 
logics is really an essentially ex tensional system (compared to ILl-El) in that in PTQ 
expressions always translate into extensional types and the recursion of the logical rules 
is defined on the extensional level whenever possible, IntensiOlts are introduced in PTQ 
syntactically by prefixing the intension operator ,,,, to all functional arguments (e.g. a 
("{3)) . In this way, Montague maintains an extensional ontology for basic as well as 
derived expressions. That is, sentences denote truth values rather than propositions, 
predicates denote sets rather than properties, etc. The syntactic intensionalization of 
arguments (based on the use of the counterintuitive intensional operator '''' ) is motivated 
by the desire to provide a general basis for a uniform syntactic treatment of intensional 
and ex tensional contexts. While this syntactic uniformity is laudable from a linguistic 
point of view, it leads in the extensional environment of the overall PTQ-system not only 
to the cumbersome switching between intensional and ex tensional levels mentioned before, 
but .also to an enormous overgeneration cif intensions. 
Consider for example Montague's analysis of sentence (8) . 
(8) John seeks a unicorn . 
Following the traditional analysis kind of example, Montague treats (8) as being ambiguous 
between a specific (or de re) reading and a non-specific (or de dicta) reading regarding a 
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unicorn. On the specific reading (S) entails the existence of a unicorn, while on the non-
specific reading there need not be any unicorns in order for the reading to be true. Thus 
EG is not valid on the non-specific reading. The two readings are characteriz~d in PTQ 
m terms of the following two formulas: 
(S) a. specific reading: 
Vx [unicorn' (x) A seek' (Aj, AA PP {x} ) ] 
b. I.lon-specific reading: 
seek' (A j, AAPYX [unicorn' (x) A P{x}] ) 
Note that the only place in (Sa) and (Sb) where an intension is required for truth-
conditional reasons is the -second argument position of (Sa) . For all other in tensions in 
(Sa) and (Sb) the existence of corresponding extensions is required in order for - the 
sentences to have the right meaning properties. 
In order to eliminate the inappropriate intensionalization of arguments m PTO, 
Montague defines a number of meaning postulates, which function as restrictions on models . 
Consider for example formula (15) (from PTO, p. 265) which guarantees the extensional 
first order reducibility of extensional common nouns and extensional intransitive verbs in 
all logically possible models (i.e. in all models obeying the meaning postulates of PTQ) . 
(15) O [o(x) ...... o* e x) ] , if 0 translates any member of BeN or Brv other than price, 
temperature, rise, or change. 
On -the basis of meaning postulates, (Sa) and (8b) can be proven equivalent to (8a') and 
(Sb') , respectively, in all logically possible models. 
(8) a' Vu [unicorn' *" seek' * (j, u)] 
b'. seek' (Aj, AAPVU [unicorn'* (u) A P {AU}]) 
Though (Sa) and (Sb) are equivalent to (Sa') and (Sb' ), respectively, Montague takes 
great care in PTQ to apply all possible reductions, because only the reduced formulas 
exhibit the crucial denotation-conditional contribution of the meaning-postulates explicitely. 
Let us now compare the semantic analysis of (8) with the corresponding extensional 
example (3) : 
(3) John finds a unicorn. 
Since (3) has a similar surface structure to (8) , it is given the same analysis as (8) and 
translates into the formulas (3a) and (3b) : 
(3) a. Vx [unicorn' (x) A find' (A j, AAPP{X})] 
b. find' (A j, "APyX [unicorn' (x) " P{x}] ) 
But (3) , in contrast to (S) , is not ambiguous. Therefore, Montague defines meaning 
postulates which guarantee that in all logically possible models (3b) is equivalent to the 
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extensional version of (3a) . The formula in question (from PTQ, p. 265) is: 
(16) O[o(x, P ) <--> P {AAYO* e x, V y) ) ] , if 0 translates any member of ETV other than 
seek or conceive. 
(P is defined as a variable ranging over term-denotations. ) 
On the basis of (15) and (16) , the translations (3a) and (3b) may be shown equivalent 
to (3c) in all logically possible models: 
(3) c. Vu [unicorn'J(. A find'." (j, u)] 
Note that this reduction is not possible in the case of (8) SInce the predicate seek is 
explicitly excluded from (16) . 
Considering Montague's traditional approach to model theory (traditional in that the 
model functions as a substitute for reality) .. and the associated extensional ontology, his 
use of meaning postulates as a means to distinguish between intensional and ex tensional 
contexts may be regarded as reasonably well motivated. Montague follows the line of 
.Frege as well as Quine in that for him the crucial difference between an ex tensional and 
an in tensional context is a difference in denotation , i.e. a difference in the an intensional 
kind of object denoted by an expression, depending on whether the expression appears in 
or extensional context. Meaning postulates may be seen as a convenient tool to achieve 
this differentiation with regads to denotation without any differentiation in the respective 
denotation conditions of extensional versus intensional predicates. Note that Montague 
translates ex tensional and in tensional predicates alike into unanalyzed constants (e.g. 
find and $eek translate into find' and seek' , respectively) . My objection to meaning 
postulates, however, is that they constitute an extremely cumbersome and obscure way of 
encoding essentially lexical information by restricting the set of possible models. 
6. A lexical analysis of intensional versus ex tensional predicates 
Let us turn now to an alternative analysis of intensional and extensional contexts 
in a strictly intensionalized system such that 
a) expressions . uniformly d.enote intensions In intensional as well as extensional 
contexts, 
b) no intension operator is defined , 
c) no meaning postulates are defined, and 
d) the semantic difference between extensional and intensional contexts is formulated 
in terms of different denotation conditions for intensional versus extensional 
predicates. 
The first question we have to answer is where in the grammar the distinction between 
extensional and intensional predicates should originate. 
The behavior of ex tensional and intensional predi<;a tes of the same category (like 
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find and seek ) is syntactically alike but semantically different. The converse situation IS 
constituted by such predicates as man e Bv / e and walk e Bve , whose behavior IS 
syntactically different but semantically alike. In PTQ, the latter case is treated in the 
lexicon in terms of different subcategories (defined in terms of different numbers of slashes 
'/') which correspond to the same semantic type. The former case, on the other hand, is 
treated in PTQ in terms of meaning postulates , which list the predicates to which they 
do or do not apply. For our treat!TIent , however, let us also mark the difference between 
extensional and intensional predicates in the lexicon, by introducing different sub·types 
which correspond to the same category. 
(17) If cp is an ILl- constant of type <s« s, b), a» (a, bE TYPE) , then cp is of the .. . 
sub-type <s, « s, b), a» if cp is an extensional predicate and of the sub·type 
.,. 
<s, « s, b) , a» if cp is an intensional predicate. 
We may now define the rule of functional application in IL l in such a way that the 
general difference between intensional and extensional predicates is reflected in terms of 
different denotation conditions (where the sub· type diacritics .j. and .,. control to which 
clause a given predicate should be the input) . 
(18) the rules of functional application in ILl : 
a. If a E ME (s, «s,b>,a» and ,8E ME (s,b> (where a and bE TYPE) then a ( f3 ) 
E ME (s,a>. 
b- int. If aEME (s, «i ,b>,a» and ,8E ME (s,b> , then a (,8)"" ,s 
IS a function from I X J to D a ,A,I,] such that [V a (,8) ] ®,;, i,s 
is [Va]@,i ,j ,gCB)®,i, j, g. 
b- ext. If aEME (s, «~ , b> , a» and ,8E ME (s,b) , then a ( f3 ) ,g 
IS a function from I x ] to D a,A ,I,] such that [Va C,8)] @,;,i,g 
IS [Va*J®;, i, g [vf3]®,; ,i,g, where a* is of type <s, « b) , a» . 
The rules in (18) account for the validity of SI (i.e. substitutivity of identical extensions) 
in extensional contexts and the failure of SI in intensional contexts. Thus , if a is a 
predicate of type ( s, « s, b), a» , and ,8, r are of type (s , b) such that V(,8= r )@,; ,i,g is 1 
while VD (,8 = r )®,;,i ,g is 0, then V (a (,8) = a (r ) )®, ;,i,g is 1 if a is an extensional predicate, 
but 0 if a is an intensional predicate. The pertinent definitions of '=' and '0', as well 
as all other operators of ILl are stated in the appendix (section 4) . 
Before we summarize our alternative analysis by presenting the derivations of the 
examples (3) and (8) in the ILl- El system, it remains to take care of the validity versus 
failure of EG in ex tensional versus intensional contexts. While Montague treats this 
feature in PTQ in terms of the derived meaning postulate stated under (16) above, I 
propose to encode the transparency versus opacity of an argument term directly in the 
translation of the predicates in qv.estion. This is done in terms of lexical derivation rules, 
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which for numerous other reasons must be part of the grammar anyway. Generally speaking, 
we assume that words are derived via lexical derivation rules from a limited number of 
basic roots . In this way, complex expressions are bulit up only from complete words, 
syncategorematic operations are avoided in the non-lexical syntax, and the priniciple of 
surface compositionality is maintained. Schematically, the syntactic and semantic derivations 











words ---------+> sentence 
~ wlrd ) senLnce 
translations translation 
~ ~ 
- ~dcl ~ru~tu~ - - - - -
For reasons of perspicuity, I will present lexical deri~ations schematically rather than in 
terms of surface derivation rules and translation rules . (20) specifies the lexical derivation 
of the word finds E B (vT)/T from the root find'EME <s,f((ve)/e);, whereby the trans-
parency of the object position is encoded in terms of variables and lambda operators: 
(20) ~{j\cl~E B' /'J '/ T 
find' E ME <s, «~ ,e> , «; " " t>/)->;'P jJ.. Po(P oJ..x O(PjA.XI (find' (xo, xJ ) ) 
Now consider the opaque object position of the intensional verb seek . It is characterized 
In our system in terms of the lexical derivation (21): 
(21) 
«s, f n ) >, 
Though lexical derivations are not defined in PTQ, their introduction is straightorward. 
The input to the rules, I.e. the roots, are defined as the elementary constants of 
intensional logic and thus as elements of the set ME <s,f (a) of meaningful expressions of 
ILl' And Ba is the set of basic surface expressions or words of cateory a. The output of 
the lexical derivation rules, i.e. analyzed·words consisting of a surface form, a category 
and an ILl- translation, are called molecules in Hausser (1982) . As in PTQ, the type of 
the molecule translation must correspond to the molecule surface. Due to the strict 
intension inherent in ILc Ej, however, the type correspnding to category a will be 
(s,f (a), and not (f (a) as in PTQ. 
Let us now consider the derivation of the exmples (3) and (8) in IL] - EI. ILI.-E] is 
like PTQ a complete system in that it simultaneously gen~rates and interpr~ t s a fragment 
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of English. Besides in having strict intensionalization, ILl - El differs from PTQ in that 
ILl-El is is sur/ace compositional, i.e. every surface word has a translation, and the 
syncategorematic introduction or elimination of surface or translation material is not 
permitted in the syntax (that part of the derivation where words are combined into 
complex expresssions) . The lexical derivation rules, however, use syncategorematic 
operations quite commonly, as illustrated in (20) and (21) above. 
Consider now (22) and (2~) , which constitute the surface compositional , strictly 
intensionalized derivation of (3) and (8) . 
(22) John finds a unicorn 






;'QAP Y x [Q ex) P A ex) J unicorn' 
lQ~ni"m'l 
t , 
;'PYx [unicorn' (x) " P (x)J 
~ 
..lP o[P o..lxo[( Vx [unicorn' (x) " find' (xo, x)J JJ ] 
'(Po[Po..lxo[( Yx [unicorn' ( x ) " find' (xo, x)J) JJ (..lPP (j» t . ::::r-=' 
[APP (j) (fxo ( Yx [unicorn' (x) A find' (xo, x) J),)J 
t I 
[ ..lxo ( Vx [unicorn' (x) " find' (to, x)]) (PJ 
Yx [unicorn' (x) ., find (j, x)] 
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(23) 
seeks 





iQAPYX [Q (X) " P (x) ] (uni~orn') 
~
AQAPYX [Q (x) A P (x) ] (unicorn~) 
.,. J 
APyX [unicorn' (x) " P(x)] 
APo(PoAxo(seek' (xo. APVx[unicorn' (x) A P (x)]») 
APo (P oAxo(seek' (xo. APYx [unicorn' (x) A P (x) J») ,CAPP (j), 
~ '. 
APP (j) ,CAxo (seek' (xo, APYx[unicorn' (x) A P (x) ]»), 
. t I 
,(xo (seek' (~ o . APy x [unicorn' (x) " P ex) ]) 41 
seek' ( j, APYx [unicorn' (x) A P (x)]) 
(The ~ -markings are intended to facilitate the reading of the lambda-reduction in 
the derivations (22) and (23) . All constants in (22) and (23) are assumed to denote 
intensional types. ) 
Note that the PTQ derivation corresponding to (22) renders the narrow scope 
formula (3b). 
(3) h. find' (Aj, "APyx (unicorn' (x) A VP (x» ) 
The wide scope formula (3a) 
(3) a. Yx (unicorn' (x) " find' (Aj, '''APVP (X» ) 
is ' generated in PTQ over an alternative derivation based on the surface syntactic technique 
of pronoun substitution (first introduced in Montague (1974, chapter 6) , and incorporated 
in PTQ as well as in ILl- El) ' Given an extensional predicate like find; the two trans-
lations are made equivalent in PTQ by means of meaning postulate (16) . In our system, 
on the other hand, the alternative derivation to (22) based on pronoun substitution 
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automatically renders a translation which is equivalent to the output of (22), as shown 
in (24): 
(24) John finds a unicorn 
. . . 
AQAPYX (Q (x) " P (x) u.' APP (j) ).P1).Po (nxo (PIAx1 ( find' (xo, XI »» APP (X,,) 
AQ).P~)\ API)'PO (P,l~PP(X II ) 
" '-r' \ t I...!-j'--= 
APYx(unicorn' (x) " P (x») \ ,(Po (nXoUPf (~n ) pXI ( find: ( Xo, XI »),» 
\ 'P, (P ',.(h , (find' (x" ~,) ),(~,,) ) 
bnd'(X"X') )) 
APO ( {AXo (find' (xo, Xo») ~) 
(APf ( j) (?xo (find; (xo, xn) ),) 
(h o (find' (!o, xo» SjJ) 
find' ( j, xo) 
V . 
APYx (unicorn' (x) A P (x» (A.xo find' (j,x")I) 
t I 
Yx (unicorn' " AX o find' (j,~) 
Yx (unicorn' (x) " find' ( j,x» 
Thus our analysis requires no meaning postlatcs to guarantee the validity of EG for objects 
of extensioual transitive verbs. 
Let us turn now to the analysis of example (8) in our system. Beside s the derivation 
(23) , which renders the translation (23') 
(23') seek' (j, APYx (unicorn' (x) " P (x») 
there is again an alternative derivation based on pronoun subsitution. Due to the particular 
translation of seek (in contrast to find , c. f. (20) and (21», this alternative derivation 
of (8) will not render the same translation as (23) , but rather the translation of the 
specific reading, as shown in (25) : 
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(25) John seeks a unicorn 
John seeks himn 
~John 
~ unicorn 
AQAPYX (Q (X) A P( x» u., APP (j) 
~
AQAPYx (9 (x) A P (x» (~) 
. ~PYx (unicorn' (x) A P (x» 
,lPo (f oAxo (seek' (xo, APP (Xn») ~) 
UPP (j) C{xo (seek' (xo, APP (Xn»),) 
t . J 
(,(xo (seek' (xo, APP (Xn» Cj) 
t 'T 
seek' C. ,lPP (xn» 
,lPYx (unicorn' (x) A P (x» Clxn (seek' (j, ,lPP(xn») 
t I I 
Yx (unicorn' (x) A hn (seek' ( j, APP (Xn» (x» 
~
Y x (unicorn' (x) A seek' ( j, ,lPP (x») 
23) and (25) correspond to the PTQ-translations (&a) and (Sb) , respectively: 
(S) a. seek' CVi, A,lP Yx[unicorn' (x) A VP (x)]) 
b. Yx [unicorn' (x) A seek' (A j, AAPVP (X) J) 
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(Sa) and (Sb) are not equated in PTQ via meaning postulate (16) -In contrast to (3a) 
and (3b) - due to the presence of the intensional predicate seek. Meaning postulate· (15), 
however, does apply to (Sa) and (Sb) , lowering unicorn' to the 'extensional' unicorn' *. 
The ILl- El analysis described above renders precisely the same truth conditions for 
(3) and (S) as PTQ. It does so, however, without the use of any meaning postulates and 
in a simpler logic that avoids switching between intensional and extensional levels. As an 
illustration of how · the truth conditions of ILl guarantee the required extensions in 
(23) I (25) consider the following ' interpretation sketch': 
(26) (v Yx [unicorn' (x) A find'(j , x)] )®,i ,i ,g is 1 if and only if 
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(V[unicorn' (x) 1\ find'(j, X)] )@,i,i,g' is 1 for at least one g'. 
(V [unicorn' (x) 1\ find' (j, X) ] )@,i,i,g' is 1 if and only if 
(V[unicorn' (x)])@,i,i,g' IS 1 and (V[find' (j, X)])@,i,i,g' IS 1. 
(V [unicorn' (x)]) ®,i,i,g' IS 1 if and only if 
(Vunicorn' *)@,i,i,&' C X) @,i ,i,&' is 1 (since unicorn' is listed as an extensional 
predicate, condition Cl8b- ext. ) applies). 
(And similarily for (v[find' (j, X) ])@,i,i,g'.) 
The indicated ILl - El analysis of seek and find extends naturally to all intensional 
(and extensional) contexts of natural language. For example, in order to handle the 
celebrated example (27) 
(27) The temperature is ninety and rises. 




~ te,perature E Bt// , 
temperature' E ME <" «l ,o>, t» ~ temperature'E ME(S,/(V/o) > 
____ ---- risetEBvT 
rise' E ME <5, «1 ,,> ,t» ~ AP (Ph (rise' (x))) EME <s,{ (VT) 
Note that instead of indicating ex tensional versus intensional argument positions in the 
roots by means of the newly introduced sub-types l a~d i (which in turn control whether 
rule ClSb-ext) or ClSb- int) is applicable for the interpretation, we could have treated 
these distinctions simply in the definition of the specific functions denoted by the different 
roots. Both solutions are compatible with our strictly intcnsional translation of, e.g. (27), 
which is given in (27') below: 
(27') Vy (Ax (temperature' (x) <->x = y) 1\ ninety' (x) " rise' (x)) 
Let us finally turn to verbs of propositional attitude. The example (31) 
(31) John believes that Cicero denounced Catiline. 
intuitively does not entail (32) : 
(32) John believes that Tulli denounced Catiline. 
The reason is that John might not know that Cicero is Tulli. But in PTQ (32) does entail 
(33), due to the rigid designator analysis of proper names (Kripke, 1972) . We may 
accommodate verbs of propositional attitudes in a formal model theory, however, by 
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relativizing the interpretation of an expression not only to a possible world i c I and a 
moment of time j c J, but also to a speaker a c A. The verb believe could then be analyzed 
as follows: 
(33) lexical analysis of believes: 
~ believesE B(v T) / t 
~ I 
believe'EME <., «; ,'>,« ','> ,') » -;. lplP (P.h (believe' (x, p» 
(34) denotation condition for believe': 
believe'@,g denotes a function from A X I X J to 
D<f((Ve)/tl> ,A,I,J such that (Vbelieve' (x, p» @,a,;,i,g 
is 1 iff CVp) ®,a',;,i,g is 1, where a' is CVx)@,a,; ,i,g. 
Thus, in the same sense that modal operators may be formally treated in terms of 
denotation conditions referring to possible worlds and tense operators may be treated in 
terms of moments of time, we may provide a truth conditionally satisfying formal analysis 
of propositional attitude predicates i~ terms of possible speakers. According to the analysis 
indicated, (31) would entail (32) only if 'Cicero is Tulli' is true 'for John (and provided 
that proper names are defined as functions which are constant only relative to possible 
worlds and moments of time, but may have different extensions relative to different 
speakers) . 
Since our denotation conditional treatment accounts for the failure of substitutivity 
with regards to (a) equivalent propositions and (b) equivalent proper names in the 
complement of verbs of propositional attitude, our reanalysis of PTQ provides a formal 
solution to both problems raised against Montague se!p.antics in Partee (1978) . But the 
question is: how compatible is the relativization of the extension of expressions to possible 
speakers with the ontology of model-theoretic semantics? 
As long as meaning is defined as a direct relation between expressions and a model 
regarded as a substitute for reality, the use of possible speakers in the index would clearly 
be ojectionable on ontological grounds; though for slightly dif(erent reasons than the use 
of possible worlds. While the basic objection to possible worlds for the extensional approach 
is that they cannot be real, the natural objection to possible speakers is that it would 
follow from their general use in the index (motivated by our treatment of propositional 
attitudes) that nothing in the model structure would have the status of an independent 
reality anymore. Our treatment of propositional attitudes assumes that all extensions are 
speaker dependent-a conclusion unacceptable to most philosophers except perhaps the most 
extreme sceptic as long as extensions are regarded as real objects. In other words, assuming 
the standard approach according to which the model structure is interpreted as a represen-
tation of reality, our treatment of propositional attitudes results in a model structure 
comparable to the 'brain in a vat' case described by Putnam (1979). In that case, Putnam 
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ponders the question of how to argue against the view that we are all brains in a vat 
and what we believe to be real is nothing but an illusion fed to the brains by a 
sophisticated simulator. 
Such arguments are not relevant, howevh, if we assume our constructive approach 
to model theory Cc. f. section 3) where the model structure is defined as a lexical space, 
serving as part of a speaker Cor a speaker simulation device (SID)), in which tokens are 
synthesized rather than ' checke~' relative to a model structure which is defined in advance 
and viewed as a substitute for reality. Questions of reality arise in our alternative approach 
only in connection with the formal build-up of a context , which is assumed to be what 
the speaker perceives and remembers at a given moment. Thus , as far as our model-
theoret ic semantics is concerned- and the indicated pragmatics in terms of token/ context-
matching as well-, we may rema in completely neutral with regards to the controversy 
between nominalists, empiricists, positivists, realists, and scep tics: even though our approach 
is inherently speaker-relative,-which makes it compatible with our forma l treatment of 
propositional att itudes- , the possibility or likelihood of the existence of an objective, 
independent reality outside the speaker or the SID is neither precluded nor presumed . 
7. Concluding remark 
Before we turn in the appendix to the formal definition of a strictly intensional 
logic let us return once more to the characteristic differences between an intensional and 
an ex tensional logic. A system may be called ex tensional if it either 
i) allows unrestricted substitution of equivalent expressions, or 
ii) fails to treat the difference between intensional and extensional contex ts, or 
iii) avoids the use of possible worlds. 
The system advocated in this paper and defined m the append ix is intensional in the sense 
of (ii) and Ciii) , i.e. it treats the difference between intensional and extensional contexts 
in terms of different denotation conditions, and it uses the notion of possible worlds. 
However, since according to our approach the model-structure is part of the SID (in 
contrast to the standard approach , where the speaker/ hearer is part of the model-st ructure ) , 
we interpret possible worlds intuitively as belief-states of the SID and not as possible 
states of the universe . We thus use the term possible world in a technica l sense in order 
to maintain th e traditional definition of the model operators and intensions. A similar 
reinterpretation holds of our notion of an extension, which we interpret in the sense of 
'value of an intension funct ion ' but not in the sense of 'object of SID- external rea lity'. 
Note that with respect to ( i) , our strictly intensional logic may be called extensional in 
that it allows unrestricted substitution of equivalent expressions. The reason is that 
expressions always denote intcnsions in our logic, defi.ned as functions from world-time-
speaker triples to extensions. 
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Another 'extensional' feature of our strictly in tensional logic is the absence of an 
intension operator ''''. Mathematically speaking, this is probably the most interesting 
property of our system. It simplifies the logic in that it removes one of the two restrictions 
on lambda conversion (cf. Gallin, 1975: 18 and 19, AS4) , according to which Ax,,[Ap (x )] 
B~=Ap(B,, ) is not valid if x lies within the scope of A (unless B is modally closed) . For 
a more extensive discussion of this particular feature of extensional systems with intension-
and lambda-operator (like PTQ) see Link (1979, 106 and 158) . 
8. Appendix: definition of the strictly intensional logic ILl 
The strictly intensionalized logic presented below is a revised version of ILl> defined 
In Hausser (1978b, section 1. 7, 1- 3) . Besides some improvements in the formulation of 
the rules, the present version differs from the earlier definition in that intensions are 
defined as functions from speaker-world-time triples , rather than world-time pairs , to 
extensions, and in that the believe-operator B is defined. 
1. The Ill - Lexicon 
1.1. Types 
Let e, t, and s be three objects (0, 1, ~nd 2) that are distinct and not an ordered 
pair or triple . The TYPE, or set of types of ILl is the smallest set Y such that 
(l) e,t E Y; 
(2) whenever a , bE Y, (a, b)EY, and 
(3) whenever aE Y, (s, a)EY. 
1 . 2. Basic Expressions 
We shall employ denumerably many variables and infinitely many constants of each 
type. In particular, if n is any natural number and AETYPE, we understand by v n,' 
the nth variable of type a , . and by Con. the set of constants of type a. 
2 . The IL l-Interpretation 
2 . 1. Possible Denotations 
Let A, I, J be any sets, which we may regard as the set of entities (or individuals) , 
the set of possible worlds, and set of moments of time, respectively . In addition let ' a be 
a type. Then D. ,A,I,J or the set of possible denotations of type a corresponding to A ,I, 
and J may be introduced by the following recursive definition: 
D.,A,I,J= A 
Dt,A, I,J= {O, I} 
D -D D. ,A'!') 
<a,b>,A,I,J - b,A .I , J 
D -D A x ] x I <s, a> ,A,I,J - 1I ,A, J,J 
2. 2 . Interpretation or Intensional Model 
JG8 
By an interpretation is understood a quintuple (A, I, J, <: , F ) such that 
( l) A, I, J are non-empty sets, aoEA, io E I, io E J , where ao, io , and io are regarded 
as the speaker, the utterance world, and the utterance moment, respectively; 
(2) <: is a simple (that is, linear) ordering having J as its field; 
(3) F is a function having as its domain the set of all constants, and 
(4) whenever a E TYPE and aECon", F (a ) E Da,A,I,J 
2. 3. Intension and Extension 
Sl1ppose that ® is an interpretation having the form ( A, I , J, <: , F). 3uppose also 
that g is an ® assignment (of values to variables) , that is , a function having as its 
domain the set of all variables and such that g (u)ED., A,I,J whenever u is a variable of 
type a . If a is a meaningful expression (i.e. a member of the set ME to be defined below) 
and a is of type ( s, a), we shall understand by a@,g -the intension of a with respect to ® 
and g; if ( a, i, i) E A X I X J, then a ®, c ( a, i, i») is to be the extension of a - that is the 
function value of the intension of a when applied to the point of reference (a, i, i) . 
3. The Synta.7: and Semantics 0/ IL L 
The set of meaningful expressions ME of ILl is recursively defined in the clauses 
(1- 12), while the corresponding denotation conditions are recursively defined in clauses 
(1 ' - 12') : 
(l) Every constant of type ( s, a) is in ME <s, .> . 
Cl ' ) If a is a constant of type (s,a) , then a @,i is F (a ) . 
(2) Every variable of type ( s, a) is in ME <s,a> . 
(2') If a is a -variable of type ( s, a) , then a@,g is g(a ) . 
(3) If aEME <s,a>, then (Va )EMEa. 
(3') If aEME<s, a> and (a, i, i) EAx I x J, then (va )@,a,;,i ,g is a @,K ( a , i , i» . 
(4) If a E ME <s, . > and a variable of type ( s, b) , then ),uaE ME<s, «s,b>,.». 
(1' ) If a E ME <s a> and u is a variable of type ( s, b) , then (),ua)O»,g is that function 
h from A x 'I X J to Da A I J D{s, b>A,I ,J such that whenever x is in the domain , , , 
of D <s,b>,A,I,J, h ( i, i» (x) is (Va Y'· ,·,;,i ,R' , where g' is the (EJ-assignment like 
g except for the possible difference that g' (u) is x. 
(5) If a E ME <s,«s,b>,a» and j3EME <s,b) , then a (j3) E ME <s,.>. 
(5' ) If a E ME <s, «s, b> , .» and j3EME <s,b) , then a ( j3) is a function from A x I x J 
to D. ,A ,I,J such that (V(a ( j3»)<lil,·,I,i,g is (Va )Cil ,.,I, i,i(j3)@,g.14 
14 Since the specifica ti on of ex tensional versus int ensional sub-types is required only for unan-
alyzed ILcconstants, and since each of these ILl- constan ts will ultimately require its own definition 
(i. e. the 'Zuordnungsbestimmung' of th e function denoted) we state only the the in tensional clause 
of the rule of funct ion application (i_e. (ISb- int) , and assume that the role of the extensional 
clause (ISb-ext) is carried out in the definition of each extensional constant, Thus the postulation 
of sub -types (c. f. (17)) is not essential to our solution. 
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(6) If a , j3EME <s, a>, then (a =j3)E ME <s, t>. 
(6') If a ,j3E ME <s, a> , then (a = j3) ®,g is a function from A x I x J to Dt,A,I,] such 
that (V(a=j3) ) @,a,i,i,g is 1 if and only if (va )@,a,i, i,g is (vj3)®,a, i,i ,g. 
(7) If q'>EME<s,t>, then -cp E ME <s, t> . 
(7' ) If cpE ME <s, t>, then ( -</» ®,g is a function from A x I x J to Dt,A,I,] such that 
(v_ cp)®,a,i,i,g is 1 if and only if (vcp)®,a,i,i ,g is O. 
(8) If </>, <jJ E ME <s, t>, then (</>"</», (rpv<jJ) , (</>-+rp)E ME <s, t> . 
(8' ) If cp, <jJE ME <s to then (Awl,)@,g is a function from A x I x J to Dt A I ] such that , '1~ 't' , , , 
(V(cp"<jJ)@.,i,i,g is 1 if and only if C cp)@,a,i,i,g is 1 and c </» ®,a,i ,i ,g is 1; and 
similarily for v and -+. 
(9) If rpE ME <s, t> and u is a variable , then Vu</> and 
(9' ) If cp E ME <s, t> and u is a variable of type ( s, a) , 
from A x I x J to Dt,A,I,] such that C Vucp)®,a ,i,i ,g 
AU</>E ME <s, t> . 
then Vuqlj),g is a function 
is 1 if and only if there 
exists XE D <s, a>,A, I,] such that (vcp)®,a,i,i,g' is 1, where g' is as in (4); and 
similarily for A urp. 
(l 0) If cpEME<s, t>, then D cpEME <s, t>. 
(l0' ) If cpEME<s, t> , then vDcp@,g is a function from A x l x ] to Dt,A, I,] such that 
(vDcp)®,a,i,i,g is 1 if and only if (vcp)@,a,iI,i',g is 1 for all i'EI and YE]. 
(11) If cpE ME <s,t>, then Wcp and HCPE ME <s,t>. 
(11') If cpE ME <s, t> , then Wcp®,g is a function from A x I x J to Dt,A,I,] such 
(VWcp) ®,a, i,i,g is 1 if and only if (vcp)@,a, i,i',g is 1 for at least one j', Y> i; 
and similarily for H . 
(12) If p E ME <s, t> and a E ME <s,c>, then B (a , p) E ME <s, t> . 
(12' ) If p E ME <s, t> and a E ME <s,e) , then B (a,p)tU' ,g is a function from A x l x J to 
Dt,A, I,] such that (VB (a , p»®, a, i,i,g is 1 if and only if (vp)®,a',i, i,g is 1, where 
a' is (vx )®,a ,i,i,G.I !.i 
Nothing is in any set MEa except as required by (1- 12) . If cp is a formula (that is, a 
member of MEt), then cp is true with respect to ® ,a,i , j if and only if cp®,a,i,i,g is 1 for 
every ® assignment g. 
In line with the synthesizing approach outilned in section 0~3 above, l~t us 
assume that ® is a lexical model of a given SID which partially specifies the denotation 
of any two ILl-constants of equal type in terms of inclusion, overlap, etc". of their 
extensions according to the 'lexical intuition' of the SID. An ILrsentence cp is a syntactic 
15 The analysis of believe-contex ts in the present paper trea ts a sentence like "John doesn't 
believe that Zombies dream and John doesn' t beli eve that Zombies don't dream" (or "John neither 
believes that Zombi es dream nor does he beli eve that th ey don't dream") as a contradiction, i.e. 
it is not possible to express in the present logic that someone has no opinion about something. 
This defici ency is naturally resolved, however, if we admit undefined denotations. For a defi nition 
of a presupposit iona l logic in Montagll c Grammar sec Hallsscr (l!l7Ga ) _ 
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tautology , if no lexical model @ can be defined in which a model structure satisfyirig 
[V -1>J can be constructed. A sentence 1> is a lexical tautology in a given lexical model @ , 
if no model structure satisfying Cv -1» can be constructed in @ and 1> is not a syntactic 
tautology. And similarily for syntactic and lexical contradictions. 
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